

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 001295
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF/E:GWSCOTT/RPOST:CJ
APPROVED BY AF:RMMOOSE
S/S-O:JETHYDEN

-----075577 051549Z /53

O P 051540Z JAN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 001295

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, FT, US, KE

SUBJECT: US-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS:

REFS: A) NAIROBI 16727; B) STATE 305836(NODIS)

I. REGRET DELAY IN RESPONDING TO REF A WHICH OCCASION-
ED IN PART BY FACT THAT IMMEDIATE NEED FOR KENYAN
DEMARCHE TO ETHIOPIANS APPEARS TO HAVE PASSED. IT
MIGHT STILL BE USEFUL FOR THE KENYANS TO EXPRESS TO
THE ETHIOPIANS THEIR FEELING THAT GREATER BALANCE IN
ETHIOPIA'S RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WOULD BE
DESIRABLE. THE DELIVERY OF SUCH A MESSAGE BY THE
KENYANS WOULD SEEM TO US TO SERVE KENYAN INTERESTS AS
WELL AS OURS AND SHOULD NOT REQUIRE US TO PROVIDE A
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THERE DOES NOT NOW APPEAR TO BE ANY URGENT NEED FOR
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SUCH A DEMARCHE.

2. IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF THE OGADEN CONFLICT
WITH KENYAN OFFICIALS (WHETHER MWANGI OR OTHERS),
EMBASSY NAIROBI SHOULD STRESS THAT THE U.S. HAS
CONSISTENTLY AND REPEATEDLY REAFFIRMED U.S. SUPPORT
FOR ETHIOPIA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY BOTH PUBLICLY AT

NUMEROUS SUCCESSIVE DEPARTMENT NOON PRESS BRIEFINGS AND PRIVATELY IN CONTACTS WITH ETHIOPIAN OFFICIALS (REF A PARA I2 (A)). WITH RESPECT TO REF A PARA I2 (B), US HAS TOLD THE SOMALIS DIRECTLY THAT WE DO NOT FEEL THAT ANY MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE OGADEN CAN ENDURE SINCE MILITARY VICTORY BY ONE SIDE TODAY WILL MERELY INVITE THE OTHER TO SEEK A MILITARY VICTORY TOMORROW; WE HAVE ALSO TOLD PRESIDENT SIAD THAT IN OUR VIEW ONLY A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION HAS A CHANCE OF LASTING AND THAT HE WOULD BE WELL-ADVISED TO START THINKING OF WHAT, SHORT OF SOMALIA'S DESIRED GOALS, HE WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT, SINCE WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE IS THE KEY TO ANY NEGOTIATION.

3. AS TO REF A PARA I2 (C), YOU MAY INFORM THE KENYANS THAT WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO THE SAUDIS (AND SOMALIS AND MANY OTHERS) THAT WE CANNOT PROVIDE ARMS TO SOMALIA WHILE OGADEN CONFLICT REMAINS UNRESOLVED, THAT WE CANNOT PERMIT THIRD-COUNTRY TRANSFERS OF US-ORIGIN MILITARY ITEMS, THAT WE FEEL THAT THE ONLY WAY THE CONFLICT CAN BE SOLVED IS THROUGH NEGOTIATION, THAT WE THEREFORE DEPLORE THE SOVIET PROVISION OF VAST QUANTITIES OF ARMS TO ETHIOPIA SINCE THE PROVISION OF ARMS TO EITHER SIDE MERELY ENCOURAGES RESORT TO VIOLENCE RATHER THAN NEGOTIATION. IF THESE REASONS FOR OUR ABSTENTION FROM SUPPLYING ARMS DO NOT ACCORD WITH SAUDI NATIONAL INTERESTS, NO FURTHER ARGUMENTATION ON OUR SECRET

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4. EMBASSY SHOULD ALSO CONVEY TO THE KENYANS OUR DISAPPOINTMENT THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN KENYA AND SOMALIA HAVE DETERIORATED IN RECENT MONTHS. KENYANS WILL RECALL THAT BEFORE AGREEING IN PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE DEFENSIVE ARMS TO SOMALIA WE CONSULTED WITH KENYANS WHO AGREED WITH OUR VIEW THAT A LESSENING OF SOMALI DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION, AND CORRESPONDING INCREASED TIES BETWEEN SOMALIA AND WESTERN COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO KENYA, SHOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR GREATER ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN KENYA AND SOMALIA. WE HAVE INDICATED TO THE GOK OUR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT EFFORTS THE GOK MIGHT UNDERTAKE IN THE NORTHEAST PROVINCE TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE SOMALIS LIVING THERE AND THEREBY STRENGTHEN THEIR TIES TO NAIROBI RATHER THAN MOGADISCIO. WE BELIEVE SUCH EFFORTS COULD INCREASE PROSPECTS OF SECURING FROM THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT A PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO THE INVIOABILITY OF THE KENYA-SOMALIA BORDER.

6. WHILE WE READILY APPRECIATE THAT THE SOMALI MOVE INTO THE OGADEN HAS RAISED GRAVE APPREHENSIONS AMONG THE

KENYANS, WE CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT KENYA'S LONG-TERM INTERESTS WILL BEST BE SERVED BY NURTURING A RELATIONSHIP WHICH LEADS SOMALIA AWAY FROM CONFRONTATION WITH KENYA AND

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7. FURTHERMORE, TO THE EXTENT THAT KENYAN SUPPORT STRENGTHENS THE MENGISTU REGIME, IT HAS THE PRINCIPAL EFFECT OF CONSOLIDATING THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN ETHIOPIA. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH A STRENGTHENED SOVIET POSITION IN THE AREA COULD WORK TO KENYA'S DISADVANTAGE, PARTICULARLY SHOULD A TIME OF POLITICAL TRANSITION OCCUR WHEN OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE TEND TO BE MAXIMIZED.

8. WE WOULD URGE A MORE BALANCED KENYAN POSITION BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA COUPLED WITH EFFORTS TO FIND AT LEAST SOME AREAS OF COOPERATION WITH SOMALIA. SUCH EFFORTS, IN OUR VIEW, STAND A BETTER CHANCE OF CONTRIBUTING TO KENYA'S LONG-TERM SECURITY THAN DO POLICIES WHICH TEND TO ENHANCE THE SOVIET CAPACITY FOR MISCHIEF IN THE REGION. A POLICY BASED ON SUCH CONSIDERATIONS IS NOT NECESSARILY INCOMPATIBLE WITH A CONCERN FOR ETHIOPIAN SECURITY, BUT IT PERMITS A MORE NUANCED APPROACH AND ONE WHICH IN ADDITION FACILITATES THE EFFORT OF THE U.S. AND OTHERS AMONG KENYA'S FRIENDS TO USE THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO WORK FOR A SOMALI COMMITMENT TO THE INVIOABILITY OF THE KENYA/SOMALIA BORDER. CHRISTOPHER

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

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DRAFTED BY IO/UNA:BJSHARP

APPROVED BY IO/UNA:AFHOLLOLOWAY

S/S-O:MVKENNEDY

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P 071820Z JAN 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 001295

EXDIS FOR AMB YOUNG FM UNA

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 001295 ACTION NAIROBI INFO ADDIS ABABA
MOGADISCIO JAN 5.

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 001295

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Message Attributes

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Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
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Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Reference: 77 NAIROBI 16727, 77 STATE 305836
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Review Content Flags:
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Review Exemptions: n/a
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SAS ID: 3823875
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS
TAGS: PFOR, PDIP, FT, US, KE
To: NAIROBI
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